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("EAJA") to the language of Rule 11 
which it considered analogous. 
Under the EAJA, the federal govern-
ment must be "substantially justified" 
for its action or inaction. If litigants are 
forced to challenge the federal govern-
ment's activities in court, attorney fees 
may be awarded against the government 
unless its activities were "substantially 
justified." A district court's decision on 
that issue is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. Id. at 2459-60 (cit-
ing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 US. 552, 
559-60 (1988». 
The Court reasoned that determining 
whether an action was "substantially 
justified" under the EAJA was analogous 
to determining whether an attorney's 
complaint was factually well-grounded 
and legally tenable for Rule 11 purposes. 
Both situations require fact-specific find-
ings which, according to the Court, the 
district courts are in a better position to 
make. Furthermore, district courts are 
"best acquainted with the local bar's lit-
igation practices and thus best situated 
to determine when a sanction is war-
ranted to serve Rule 11 's goal of specific 
and general deterrence." Id. at 2460. 
Since an abuse of discretion standard 
had been applied to district court find-
ings under the EAJA, the Court held that 
the same standard of review was appro-
priate for district court findings under 
Rule 11. Id. at 2460-61. 
Finally, the Court considered the peti-
tioner's contention that the court of 
appeals erroneously found that Rule 11 
sanctions may include attorney fees in-
curred as a result of an appeal of the 
sanction. The Court interpreted the lan-
guage of Rule 11 and the drafter's com-
ments as limited to those costs directly 
incurred as a result of the filing of the 
frivolous suit. The Court reasoned that 
o . 
the attorney fees on appeal dld not stem 
from the filing of the complaint, but 
rather from the imposition of the sanc-
tions by the district court. Id. at 2461. In 
that Rule 38 provides attorney fees and 
damages for wrongful appeal, the Court 
reasoned, the scope of Rule 11 is natu-
rally limited to fees connected with the 
filing of the complaint. Id. at 2462. Fol-
lowing the American rule that the pre-
vailing litigant would not ordinarily be 
entitled to attorney fees, the Court rev-
ersed on this issue. Id. 
In Cooter & Gell, the decision of the 
Court clarifies the manner in which 
Rule 11 should be applied by district 
courts. Now, even if a plaintiffvoluntar-
ily dismisses a suit, the district court may 
impose sanctions for violation of Rule 
lIon both the plaintiff and the plaintift's 
attorney, subject only to review for 
abuse of discretion. 
- Laura Campbell 
NOW v. Operation Rescue: INJUNC. 
TION PROHIBITING BLOCKING 
ACCESS TO ABORTION F ACILI· 
TIES IN VIOLATION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS CONSPIRACY STATUTE 
UPHELD 
In NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit held that pro-life demonstrators 
could be enjoined from blocking entry 
to an abortion clinic on the ground that 
it denied women their constitutional 
right to interstate travel in violation of 
the civil rights conspiracy statute. The 
court affirmed the district court injunc-
tion on the ground that there was no 
abuse of discretion. 
The plaintiffs/appellees (hereinafter 
"NOW') were nine clinics that pro-
vided abortion-related services and five 
organizations devoted to preserving 
women's rights to obtain abortions. De-
fendants/appellants (hereinafter "Op-
eration Rescue") were Operation Res-
cue, a pro-life organization, and six 
individuals who opposed abortion and 
sought to have the procedure made 
illegal. 
NOW filed a motion for a temporary 
restraining order in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia. They sought to enjoin Opera-
. tion Rescue from blocking entry to and 
exit from facilities that offered abortion 
and abortion-related services. The mo-
tion was filed, and granted, in anticipa-
tion of rescue demonstrations which 
were scheduled to take place in the 
immediate future in the Washington 
metropolitan area. Although the court 
enjoined the defendants from "tres-
passing on, blockading, impeding or 
obstructing access to or egress from the 
[listed 1 premises," it declined to extend 
the injunction to the activities that 
tended to "intimidate, harass or disturb 
patients or potential patients." Id. at 
584. 
The district court concluded that the 
defendants' activities violated the provi-
sions of 42 US.c. § 1985(3) (1988) by 
depriving women seeking abortions and 
abortion-related services of their consti-
tutional right to travel interstate in 
search of medical facilities. Id. To bring 
a successful action under § 1985( 3), the 
court noted, a plaintiff must prove a 
conspiracy to deprive any person, or 
class of persons, of the equal protection 
of the laws, or of the equal privileges and 
immunities under the law. In addition, 
the plaintiff must prove that the conspir-
ators committed acts in furtherance of 
their goals, thus causing injury to per-
sons or property, and depriving any right 
or privilege of a citizen of the United 
States. NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 
F.2d at 584 (citing 42 US.C. §1985 
(3». The district court reasoned that 
rescue demonstrations were acts in fur-
therance of a conspiracy which inter-
fered with the right to travel in that 
many women in the Washington metro-
politan area traveled interstate to obtain 
abortions and abortion related services. 
Id. at 585. 
Finally, the district court concluded 
that injunctive relief was appropriate 
because: "(i) there was no adequate 
remedy at law; (li) the balance of equi-
ties favored the plaintiffs; and (iii) the 
public interest was served by granting 
the injunction." Id. 
The defendants appealed the order, 
arguing that there was insufficient evi-
dence to grant relief against three of 
their members. Id. at 586. NOW cross-
appealed on the ground that the scope 
of the injunction was too narrow, con-
tending that the district court abused its 
discretion in limiting the injunction to 
Northern Virginia and for refusing to 
grant the requested relief on a perma-
nent basis. Id. The arguments of both 
parties were duly noted, but the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed the ruling of the lower 
court. 
Citing the ruling of the district court, 
the fourth circuit court agreed that the 
defendants' conduct crossed the line 
from persuasion to coercion, denying 
women the exercise oflegallyprotected 
rights. Id. at 585. Further, the court 
noted that the district court holding was 
consistent with at least six other circuit 
courts of appeals which have similarly 
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interpreted the "purpose" element of 
§1985(3) such that "gender-based ani-
mus" fulfilled its terms. Id. The circuit 
court also referred to New York NO W v. 
Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990). In 
New York NOW, a factually similar case, 
the second circuit court of appeals held 
that blocking access to abortion facili-
ties that served interstate clientele vio-
lated the constitutional right to travel. 
NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914 F.2d at 
585. 
In determining whether the district 
court acted properly in granting the 
injunction, the circuit court noted Pren-
dergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 US. 43, 
50-51 (1923), as providing the appro-
priate standard of review. In Prender-
gast, the Court held that the factors to 
be considered in reviewing whether 
there was an abuse of discretion are the 
entry, duration, and scope ofthe injunc-
tion. The circuit court held there was rio 
abuse of discretion in NOWv. Operation 
Rescue because the lower court ruling 
substantially conformed to the rulings of 
other circuit courts on the relevant 
questions of law. NOW v. Operation 
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 585. The court of 
appeals also found that the scope of the 
injunction was reasonable because, al-
though the district court limited the 
injunction to Northern Virginia for a 
definitive period of time, it was implicit 
in the district court opinion that the 
relief was granted against particular in-
dividuals and particular acts. The circuit 
court also affirmed the district court's 
decision not to expand the injunction to 
encompass activities tending to "intimi-
date, harass or disturb patients or po-
tential patients" on the grounds that 
those activities were protected by the 
first amendment. NOW v. Operation 
Rescue, 914 F.2d at 584. Members of 
Operation Rescue were free, by verbal 
means, to attempt to persuade women 
not to seek the services of abortion facil-
ities and to "'impress upon members of 
society' the moral rightness and inten-
sity of their opposition to abortion." Id. 
at 586 (quoting NOW v. Operation 
Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. 
Va. 1989)). 
By its ruling, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit estab-
lished that right-to-life demonstrators 
could be enjoined from blocking access 
to abortion and abortion related facili-
ties located in the fourth circuit jurisdic-
tion. In addition, NOW v. operation 
Rescue is Significant as it holds that a 
woman's right to travel cannot be in-
fringed upon by demonstrators' first 
amendment rights to freedom of speech. 
-Michael Scott Cohen 
Illinois v. Rodriguez: WARRANTLESS 
ENTRY VALID IF BASED ON THE 
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT A 
CONSENTING THIRD PARTY 
POSSESSED COMMON AUTHOR-
ITY OVER THE PREMISES 
The Supreme Court recently ex-
panded the scope of third party consent 
upon which government authorities may 
rely when entering a defendant's home. 
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 
(1990), the Supreme Court held that a 
warrantless entry by police was valid 
when based upon the consent of a third 
party whom police reasonably believed 
possessed common authority over the 
premises. 
Gail Fischer, who previously lived 
with Edward Rodriguez in his apart-
ment, was assaulted by Rodriguez and 
summoned police to her mother's home 
to report the assault. Facilitating Rod-
riguez's arrest, Fischer accompanied 
police to Rodriguez's apartment and 
consented to their entry using a key that 
she possessed. The police had neither an 
arrest warrant for Rodriguez nor a search 
warrant for the apartment. The police 
believed that Fischer had authority to 
consent based upon several references 
to the apartment as "our" apartment and 
her statement that she had clothing and 
furniture in the apartment. Upon enter· 
ing Rodriguez's apartment, the police 
observed drug paraphernalia and co· 
caine in plain view and, discovering Rod-
riguez asleep in his bedroom, they ar· 
rested him. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 
2797 (1990). 
Rodriguez moved to suppress all evi-
dence seized at the time of the arrest, 
claiming that Fischer had vacated the 
apartment several weeks earlier and 
thus no longer possessed authority to 
consent to the entry. The trial court 
agreed and granted Rodriguez's motion 
to suppress. The Appellate Court of Illi-
nois affirmed, and the Illinois Supreme 
Court denied the state's Petition for 
Leave to Appeal. The United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 
2797. 
The Court began its analysis by exa-
mining United States v. Matlock, 415 US. 
164 (1974) and the fourth amendment's 
general prohibition against warrantless 
entry into a person's home. Rodriguez, 
110 S. Ct. at 2797 (citing u.s. v. Matlock, 
415 US. 164 (1974)).InMatlock,police 
officers entered premises without a war-
rant but with the consent of a third party 
who, because of joint access or control 
of the premises, possessed common 
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at 
2797 (1990) (citing U.S. v. Matlock, 
415 US. at 171 (1974)). The Court 
upheld the validity of the police entry, 
reasoning that when an individual per-
mits another joint access to or control of 
his home, his expectation of privacy is 
lowered. However, the Matlock Court 
left unresolved the issue of the validity of 
a warrantless entry based upon consent 
of a third party, whom the police rea-
sonably believe has common authority 
to consent. Id. at 2801 (1990) (citing 
U.S. v. Matlock, 415 US. at 177 ( 1974) ). 
The Rodriguez Court, addressing the 
unresolved issue in Matlock, held that 
the reasonableness, and not the cor-
rectness, of the police officers' belief in 
the third party's authority to consent is 
the standard by which fourth amend-
ment rights should be measured. Id. at 
2800. The Court found Stoner v. Cali-
fornia, 376 US. 483 (1964) consistent 
with its reasoning in Rodriguez. Rod-
riguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2800 (1990). In 
Stoner, the Court held that police im-
properly entered Stoner's hotel room 
because it was unrealistic to believe in 
the "apparent authority" of a hotel clerk 
Id. at 2801 (citing Stoner v. California, 
376 US. 483 (1964)). 
In distinguishing Rodriguez from 
Stoner, the Court emphasized that it was 
unreasonable for police to believe that a 
hotel clerk possessed common author-
. ity to consent to an entry, whereas 
Fischer may have appeared to have such 
authority because of her joint control. 
Id. at 2801. The Court, therefore, re-
manded the case for a determination as 
to whether the police had sufficient 
grounds to support a reasonable belief 
that Fischer had authority to consent. Id. 
at 2801. If on remand it was determined 
that the police officers were reasonable 
in believing that Fischer had authOrity, 
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